Publication · 2021
Existence, Really? Tacit Disagreements about “Existence” in Disputes about Group Minds and Corporate Agents
Synthese 198, 4939–4953, 2021
Abstract
A central dispute in social ontology concerns the existence of group minds and actions. This paper argues that some authors in this dispute rely on rival views of existence without sufficiently acknowledging this divergence. The paper proceeds in three steps. First, it defines the phenomenon as an implicit higher-order disagreement by drawing on an analysis of verbal disputes. Second, it distinguishes two theories of existence—the theory-commitments view and the truthmaker view—in both their eliminativist and their constructivist variants. Third, it examines individual contributions to the dispute about the existence of group minds and actions to argue that these contributions have an implicit higher-order disagreement. This paper serves two purposes. First, it is a study to apply recent advances in meta-ontology. Second, it contributes to the debate on social ontology by illustrating how meta-ontology matters for social ontology.